Journalist\u27s Privilege and the Criminal Defendant by Edelstein, The Honorable David N. & LoBue, Robert P.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 47 Issue 6 Article 1 
1979 
Journalist's Privilege and the Criminal Defendant 
The Honorable David N. Edelstein 
Robert P. LoBue 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
The Honorable David N. Edelstein and Robert P. LoBue, Journalist's Privilege and the Criminal Defendant, 
47 Fordham L. Rev. 913 (1979). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol47/iss6/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Journalist's Privilege and the Criminal Defendant 
Cover Page Footnote 
*Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. **Member of the New 
York Bar, A.B. 1975, Brown University; J.D. 1978, University of Pennsylvania. Mr. LoBue is Chief Judge 
Edelstein's law clerk. 
This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol47/iss6/1 
JOURNALIST'S PRIVILEGE AND THE CRIMINAL
DEFENDANT
THE HONORABLE DAVID N. EDELSTEIN*
WITH ROBERT P LOBUE**
INTRODUCTION
T he United States Supreme Court has addressed the conflict be-
tween freedom of expression and the proper administration of
justice repeatedly and, in so doing, has passed upon a broad sweep of
first amendment claims. It has affirmed the effectiveness of the ban on
prior restraint even as measured against a criminal defendant's rights. I
It has curtailed the courts' power to penalize speech after the fact even
when such speech may impede goals of the judicial process.2 It will
soon decide whether the preliminary hearing procedure may be closed
to the public-and the press-in furtherance of a criminal defendant's
right to trial before an impartial jury.3 Yet, in Branzburg v. Hayes, 4
the Court refused to relieve journalists of their obligation to give
testimony relevant to a criminal investigation pursuant to a grand jury
subpoena, despite an agreement to maintain the confidentiality of their
sources. This last holding has engendered impassioned criticism from
the press, whose members have vigorously argued for a journalist's
*Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
** Member of the New York Bar. A.B. 1975, Brown University; J.D. 1978, University of
Pennsylvania. Mr. LoBue is Chief Judge Edelstein's law clerk.
1. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
2. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947), Pennekamp
v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
3. See Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 372 N.E.2d 544, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756
(1977), cert. granted, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978) (No. 77-1301).
4. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). Branzburg and its companion cases involved subpoenas requiring
reporters to testify before grand juries. In two cases, journalists who had gained the confidence of
the Black Panthers refused to appear at all. In the third, the journalist appeared but refused to
answer questions respecting criminal acts he had observed and reported. The Court held that the
first amendment does not relieve newsmen of the general obligation of citizens to appear and
answer grand jury questions relevant to a criminal investigation. Since Branz-burg, a number of
lower courts have considered the question of a journalist's privilege to withhold information from
the criminal defendant. The flurry of recent judicial activity in this area demonstrates the
continuing troublesomeness of the issue. See, e.g., United States v. Pretzinger. 542 F.2d 517 (9th
Cir. 1976); United States v. Liddy, 354 F. Supp. 208 (D.D.C. 1972); Hammarley v. Superior
Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1979); Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App.
3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); State v. Sandstrom, 224
Kan. 573, 581 P.2d 812 (1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1265 (1979); In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394
A.2d 330, cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 598 (1978); People v. Marahan, 81 Misc. 2d 637, 368 N.Y.S.2d
685 (Sup. Ct. 1975); cf. Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding in Branzburg
does not require journalist to disclose material from confidential source in civil discovery
proceeding).
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privilege to withhold names of sensitive sources and information
received in confidence. The absence of a champion for the rights of the
accused 5 is disquieting, especially when the party seeking disclosure is
not the state, but the defendant. 6 This Article is not intended to fill
such a role or to decide the journalist's privilege question once and for
all. Rather, its purpose is to explore the question in light of the vital
constitutional and jurisprudential issues it raises, and to suggest ways
and means of bringing about an accommodation and equilibrium
between opposing rights.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAl, QUESTION
The cases adjudicating conflicting first amendment rights and needs
of the judicial process have developed a familiar spectrum of free
expression theories. At the pole reserved for most persuasive first
amendment claims we find, expectedly, the inhibition on prior re-
straint as manifested in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,7 the gag
order case. One need not be an apologist for the press to know that old
news is not printed late-it is simply not printed.$ Irreparable harm is
done if a restraint is later found to be constitutionally unsupportable.
Expeditious decisionmaking is essential in such cases, but the indecor-
ous rush for a judicial determination of the validity of the restraint
repels the judicial temper. 9 This is only to suggest that the free speech
principle most securely and anciently bound to the history of the first
amendment' derives continued sustenance from modern circum-
stance. As we move away from this familiar end of the spectrum,
however, the answers become more doubtful.
5. Senator Ervin's narrative of the abortive effort to enact a federal journalist's privilege
statute in 1972 and 1973 reports that the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Judiciary Committee found it all but impossible to secure witnesses opposed to a journalist's
privilege. Ervin, In Pursuit of a Press Privilege, 11 Harv. J. Legis. 233, 266 (1974). Although an
abundance of journal articles have advocated some form of press privilege, the counterbalancing
sixth amendment right to compulsory process has been underdeveloped in commentary as well as
in the courts, as one constitutional scholar has recently noted. Schmidt, In the Matter of Free
Press vs. Fair Trail, N.Y. Times, July 30, 1978, § 4, at 11, col. 3.
6. E.g., In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, rert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 598 (1978).
7. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
8. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 423 U.S. 1327, 1329 (1975) (Blackmun, Circuit Judge,
granting, in part, application for stay of a gag order). "Where . . . a direct prior restraint Is
imposed upon the reporting of news by the media, each passing day may constitute a separate
and cognizable infringement of the First Amendment. The suppressed information grows older.
Other events crowd upon it. To this extent, any First Amendment infringement that occurs with
each passing day is irreparable." Id.
9. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 752-56 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
10. In the eighteenth century, the predominant view was that freedom of speech and of the
press prohibited prior restraint of but not subsequent punishment for speech. See 4 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries *151-52; L. Levy, Legacy of Suppression 14-15 (1960).
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What is the nature of the continuum that takes us from a principle
against prior restraint to the question whether a journalist may with-
hold the name of his confidential source? Surely the variation is not
simply along the line of the tangible burden on constitutional speech.
Whether a potential source will be deterred in any given case and
whether the news he would have generated would have had greater
significance to society than the speech directly restrained by a gag
order are imponderables. It is also amiss to say that the continuum
varies according to the weight of the opposed interest. For example,
the identical right to trial before an impartial jury is the countervailing
interest invoked whether the constitutionality of a gag order or of
closing the courtroom is at issue, yet we sense in the latter an imposition
on news gathering further removed from the core purposes of the first
amendment than the direct restraint on the press condemned in
Nebraska Press. Rather, the "unit of measurement" along the first
amendment spectrum that stretches from Nebraska Press to Branzburg
seems to depend, at least in part, upon an infrequently stated but still
important concern: the judiciary's perception of its own institutional
competence to make certain kinds of constitutional judgments. The
issue, at root, is one of legal process: it is a matter of deciding which
governmental institution may most suitably render judgment on the
question.
Judicial introspection, often on an implicit level, has played a part in
many first amendment decisions. Consider, for example, the Supreme
Court's response to the persistent claim that the first amendment
affords an absolute right against suppression of constitutional
speech-a claim that underlies the present journalist's privilege con-
troversy. Despite the eloquent efforts of some of this century's most
respected justices and commentators,"I absolutism is not the rule of the
first amendment. Reasonable persons may differ as to the propriety of
balancing competing claims to expression and suppression in the pure
speech cases. Yet, it seems clear that the Court has sensibly dealt with
the mixed speech/action cases by validating reasonable time, place,
and manner restrictions on the medium of expression,' 2 by attempting
to winnow speech from nonspeech elements of conduct, and by
explicitly balancing the individual's interest in the former against the
state's need to regulate the latter:
This Court has held that when "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in
the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulat-
ing the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment
11. See generally Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 865 (1960); Frantz. The First
Amendment in the Balance, 71 Yale L.J. 1424 (1962); Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an
Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245; Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment:
Absolutes in the Balance, 50 Calif. L. Rev. 821 (1962).
12. See generally G. Gunther, Constitutional Law 1142-1234 (9th ed. 1975) (citing cases).
1979]
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freedoms. To characterize the quality of the governmental interest which must appear,
the Court has employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; substantial;
subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong. Whatever imprecision inheres in these
terms, we think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest. 11
This statement of the rule-quoted from United States v. O'Brien, 14
the draft card burning case-is significant in that the rule evolved not
from abstract conceptions of the quality of the first amendment but
from acute perceptions of the limits of principled judicial review. The
decision in large part constituted an expression of judicial hesitance to
inquire into legislative motive. Perhaps more to the point, a premise
for the rule quoted above was the statement: "We cannot accept the
view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labelled
'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby
to express an idea."' 5 It is patent that the Court, familiar with the
definitional difficulties attendant upon symbolic speech cases, was
looking to the future and passing judgment not only on the merits of
the argument before it, but also on its own ability to decide cases in a
principled and consistent manner.
The question of a journalist's privilege to withhold confidential
information and identities, and indeed the constitutional protection to
be accorded news gathering generally,' 6 can be compared with the
mixed speech/action cases. Surely protection of news gathering, similar
to protection of expressive conduct 7 or the employment of certain
media or fora to reach an audience, ' 8 is consistent with and supportive
of first amendment goals, as the Supreme Court has recognized.19
Recourse to the text of the first amendment, however, reminds us that
it is abridgment of constitutional speech that is forbidden. 20 News
13. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
14. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
15. Id. at 376.
16. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (press has no right of access superior
to that of general public to information held by government); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417
U.S. 843 (1974) (same); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (same). As Professor Van Alstyne
has pointedly written, the claim to special access privileges for the press can be a double-edged
sword. Van Alstyne, The Hazards to the Press of Claiming a "Preferred Position," 28 Hastings
L.J. 761, 768-69 (1977).
17. E.g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
18. E.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569
(1941); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
19. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) (without some protection for news
gathering, freedom of press would be "eviscerated").
20. As Justice Stewart has observed: "So far as the Constitution goes, the autonomous press
may publish what it knows and may seek to learn what it can. But this autonomy cuts both ways.
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gathering is supportive of speech and of the common good induced by
robust political discourse, but it is not constitutional speech. More-
over, nondisclosure of confidences itself may be ancillary to and
supportive of news gathering, but it is not news gathering.2 1 Thus, the
claimed journalist's privilege seeks to protect endeavors surely relevant
to the first amendment but at least two logical degrees removed from
the constitutional imperative against abridgment of speech. 22
That the need for such an asserted privilege must be balanced
against countervailing imperatives of society is also derivable from two
somewhat analogous areas of constitutional concern. Notable Supreme
Court decisions disallowing state attempts to coerce disclosure of
associational ties have been cited as support for a newsman's constitu-
tional privilege not to disclose confidential sources of information, 23 yet
these pronouncements argue convincingly only for close scrutiny of the
competing first amendment and governmental claims. In NAACP v.
Alabama24 the state sought discovery of the NAACP's membership
roster incident to litigation attempting to oust the organization from
the state for failure to comply with its corporation statute. In Shelton
v. Tucker25, the state required its untenured public school teachers, as
a condition of continued employment, to provide a list of associations
to which they had contributed or belonged. The penalties for non-
compliance were severe: a contempt order of $100,000 against the
NAACP; nonrenewal of employment in Shelton. In both cases, the
Court recognized that, under the circumstances, confidentiality of
associational memberships was all but necessary to sustain such or-
ganized activity itself, which in turn was strongly supportive of free
The press is free to do battle against secrecy and deception in government. But the press cannot
expect from the Constitution any guarantee that it will succeed." Address by Justice Stewart,
Yale Law School (Nov. 2, 1974), quoted in The Media and the Law 2 (H. Simons & J. Califano
eds. 1976). Just as the Constitution neither requires the state to underwrite the cost of exercising
first amendment rights, nor forbids it from reasonably regulating that exercise, it does not
guarantee success by securing the confidentiality of news sources.
21. The fifth amendment guarantee against compelled self-incrimination demonstrates that
the drafters of the Bill of Rights knew how to create a privilege in explicit terms when deemed
desirable. It is therefore inferable that by the first amendment they did not mean to enact a
reporter's privilege.
22. For example, the "chilling effect" argument that is often persuasive in the first amend-
ment cases would apply, presumably, to the confidential source fearful of disclosure, and only
indirectly to the journalist. Yet it is the latter whose first amendment claim is in issue, and this
incongruity was not lost on the Court. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (privilege
claimed was that of reporter, not informant). But see Note, The Rights of Sources-The Critical
Element in the Clash over Reporters Privilege, 88 Yale L.J. 1202 (1979) (source's interest is
paramount); cf. Murasky, The Journalist's Privilege: Branzburg and Its Aftermath, 52 Tex. L.
Rev. 829, 851-53 (1974) (both informants and reporters may be chilled by absence ofprivilege).
23. E.g., Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their
Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. Rev. 18, 31 n.70, 34 (1969).
24. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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speech. Here is a rough but obvious analogy to the question of a
journalist's privilege, which is supportive of news gathering and thus,
indirectly but undeniably, of the dissemination of information.
It is instructive that, although upholding the confidentiality claim in
both cases, the Court traveled two very different routes. NAACP was
the easier case. There, the Court perceived no "substantial bearing" on
the subject matter of the litigation of the membership roster demand. 26
Shelton was more difficult because, as in the case of a subpoena
against a journalist seeking possibly exculpatory evidence on behalf of
a criminal defendant, the relevance and importance of the state's
interest were undeniable:
This controversy is thus not of a pattern with such cases as N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama
... . [There] the Court held that there was no substantially relevant correlation
between the governmental interest asserted and the State's effort to compel disclosure
of the membership lists involved. Here, by contrast, there can be no question of the
relevance of a State's inquiry into the fitness and competence of its teachers.
2 7
Confronted with competing individual and governmental interests, the
Court did not declare either to be paramount; rather, it decided
Shelton on the overbreadth principle. Such restraint, especially in the
face of evidence of questionable purposes for the state action, 28 teaches
a good deal about the institutional limitations of the judiciary. The
Court would not second-guess legislative motive; given a facially valid
state interest, unlike the NAACP case, the Court sought to decide the
disclosure question in a way that avoided establishing a hierarchy of
competing personal and governmental interests. So too, in the present
question of a journalist's privilege, alternatives to the sometimes
necessary but always difficult judicial task of weighing the opposing
interests of the individual and the state should be sought.
This is also the teaching derived from the Court's experience with
other asserted constitutional privileges. The Court has often avoided
the formulation of rigid rules in this area. For instance, when the
Government's claim for confidentiality of its informants was set up in
opposition to the criminal defendant's rights, the Court said: "We
believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable. The
problem is one that calls for balancing the public interest in protecting
the flow of information against the individual's right to prepare his
defense. '"29
The patchwork that results from such a process of adjudication of
constitutional privilege claims-and the variety of holdings in this area
25. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
26. 357 U.S. at 464.
27. 364 U.S. at 485 (footnote and citations omitted).
28. Id. at 485 n.5.
29. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53. 62 (1957).
[Vol. 4 7
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may indeed be difficult to reconcile 3 0-demonstrates not a failure of
meaningful judicial response to such claims but rather fidelity to the
essentially ad hoc adjudicatory process. Yet this process, in which
courts may be called upon explicitly to assess the relevance and
persuasiveness of competing societal interests, raises pointed questions
regarding the suitability of the courts, as the government's nonrep-
resentative branch, to decide such issues of social policy. Courts
unavoidably render value judgments in cases of constitutional stature.
These actions do not deprive their judgments of validity or authority,
but they do suggest that the legal community cultivate a role for the
legislatures as interpreters of the Constitution whose choices will be
respected, within proper limits, by the courts.
The temper of judicial restraint traced above would be especially
applicable to a question that required an assessment of the truth of a
premise that, in the court's view, was beyond its institutional capabil-
ity or expertise. The likelihood that subpoenas of journalists would
deter sources or newspapers from speech is just such a premise.
Indeed, judicial reluctance thus far to pronounce a full-fledged jour-
nalist's privilege seems as much a reaction to advocacy that has framed
the deterrence question as one dependent on assumptions or empirical
proof about behavior as it is a concession of the need to avoid absolute
rulemaking in an area where opposed interests may all appear entitled
to great weight.
Although the Court has long decided constitutional questions upon
implicit or understated findings of legislative fact, 3' robust debate on
the standard of empirical proof required to prove deterrence or the
chilling of first amendment speech only arose, it seems, with the
Branzburg opinion. Justice White, writing for the Court, noted that
"[e]stimates of the inhibiting effect of such subpoenas on the willing-
ness of informants to make disclosures to newsmen are widely diver-
gent and to a great extent speculative. ' 32 Justice Stewart's dissent
responds: "[W]e have never before demanded that First Amendment
rights rest on elaborate empirical studies demonstrating beyond any
conceivable doubt that deterrent effects exist . . . . 33 Professor
Kurland concludes that the two sides had not really joined issue:
30. See, e.g., Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence
for Criminal Cases, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 567, 626-27 & nn. 164-65 (1978) (surveying varying holdings
in which privileges were claimed in opposition to process issued pursuant to confrontation and
compulsory process clauses).
31. There are excellent discussions of this point in Moynihan, Social Science and the Courts,
54 Pub. Interest 12 (1979), and Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 Sup,
Ct. Rev. 75. See also 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 6:38 (2d ed. 1978) Chayes, The
Role of the Judge In Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281 (1976).
32. 408 U.S. at 693-94 (footnote omitted).
33. Id. at 733 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
1979]
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"Certainly [Justice Stewart] is right in this proposition. But no one
even now called for 'scientific precision'. . . . All that was asked for [by
the Court] was some evidence to support the proposition. Hyperbole
doesn't answer the demand. '34
The apparent absence of a meeting of minds on the Branzburg Court
as to the level of empirical proof required to prove deterrence does
much to explain the Court's negative decision on a journalist's privi-
lege. Surveys and statistics are not always the primary source of
judicial wisdom. 35 Consider, for example, two of the empirical surveys
before the Branzburg Court. Professor Blasi collected data by inter-
view and mail questionnaire from various persons involved in the
collection and dissemination of news. 3 6 How should a court assess the
first amendment implications of such responses as (1) threats by a
source to cut off information if he is exposed are "made far more
frequently than they are carried out";3 7 (2) developing sources depends
more on the reporter's personality than on his assurance of
confidentiality; 3 8 (3) sources are "more willing" to lie when they believe
confidentiality will not expose their fabrication to those who know
differently? 39 Similarly, another empirical study cited in Branzburg
concludes that the "present effect" of subpoenas on newsmen probably
is not great. 40
The point is not that there is insufficient empirical proof of deter-
rence or that such studies are unreliable. Is it not true, however, that
the net result of such efforts is a set of findings just as impressionistic
and speculative, or as obvious, as those derivable from common
sense?4' One of the survey takers whose results are noted above even
admits that the impact of subpoenas on news sources is ultimately
34. Kurland, 1971 Term: The Year of the Stewart-White Court, 1972 Sup. Ct. Rev. 181, 244.
35. Senator Moynihan observes: "If it is quite clear that the courts employ social science with
considerable deftness on some occasions, then it must he allowed that on other occasions the
courts have got themselves into difficult situations by beng too casual, even trusting, about the
'truths' presented to them by way of research on individual and group behavior." Moynihan,
supra note 31, at 15. Perhaps, in Branzburg, the Court was recoiling from the second category of
cases described by Senator Moynihan.
36. Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 229 (1971).
37. Id. at 245.
38. Id. at 240.
39. Id. at 248-49.
40. Guest & Stanzler, supra note 23, at 56.
41. Professor McCormick and others, for example, have often doubted-without the benefit
of empirical evidence-whether the behavioral assumptions underpinning the exclusionary rules
generally are valid. C. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence §§ 90-91, at 185-91,
§ 108, at 231-32 (2d ed. 1972); accord, Morgan, Foreword to Model Code of Evidence 22-24
(1942); see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250-75 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
Similarly, Senator "Ervin reached conclusions on the questionable impact of press privilege similar
to those of the empirical survey takers, without the benefit of their statistics. Ervin, supra note 5,
at 276.
[Vol. 47
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unquantifiable. 42 And even if more quantified results were achieved,
the next question-whether the given chilling effect outweighed the
evidentiary loss sustained because of the privilege-would pose a
subject for analysis too subtle for even the most accomplished social
scientist.
11. THE LEGISLATIVE ALTERNATIVE
The reluctance of courts to fashion a constitutional journalist's
privilege surely is not mere antipathy to the needs of reporters or
insensitivity to the requirements of the first amendment. 4 3 Rather,
Branzburg and its progeny are expressions of judicial respect for the
coordinate legislative branch of federal government, and for the states,
as interpreters and implementers of the federal Constitution. That the
issue is often argued as if empirical proof-"legislative fact"-were
decisive is consistent with this implicit declaration of judicial defer-
ence.
Schooled in the ways of Marbury v. Madison,4 4 we are accustomed
to believe that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is." 4 5 The Third Branch,
however, is not the sole agent of constitutional interpretation. Judicial
review is not absolute; it is counterbalanced by the various doctrines of
nonjusticiability that render certain constitutional and other legal
questions, often of the gravest import to our country, beyond the
power of the courts to answer. 4 6 The reasons why the judiciary will
not decide political questions,4 7 cases so unripe as to be hypothetical, 8
or issues legislatively entrusted to the special expertise of an adminis-
trative agency 49 have often been recited and need not detain us here.
We need only remember that, when the court does not decide a
question of constitutionality, it does not mean that the question
remains undecided. Rather, the effect of such refusal is to render
dispositive the constitutional judgment previously made by the legisla-
ture or executive. Yet, there are more and less subtle forms of
nonjusticiability. For example, a court may refuse to decide a case
altogether, either by constitutional compulsion or for prudential rea-
42. Blasi, supra note 36, at 265-67.
43. Contrast this with the view of Anthony Lewis that courts have developed an "animus
toward the press." Lewis, Sentence First-Trial Later, N.Y.L.J.. Sept. 26, 1978, at 3, col. 4.
44. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
45. Id. at 177.
46. See generally P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro & H. Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The
Federal Courts and the Federal System 64-241 (2d ed. 1973).
47. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886, 891-900 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
48. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-73 (1976).
49. See Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 349-50 (1951); Burford
v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
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sons, 50 or in reaching a decision it may simply withdraw a single issue
as unfit for judicial determination.5 1 Finally, judicial reluctance to
render value judgments better left to the legislature may be an
unexpressed but persuasive factor. As Professor Bickel, our most
eloquent expositor of this point, has noted, "[t]he case does not exist in
which the power of judicial review has been exercised without some
such misgivings being applicable in some degree."152
The cases on the journalist's privilege belong to the category of cases
in which this more subtle form of judicial deference to the interpretive
powers of the legislative departments, both federal and state, suggests
the better result without requiring an outright declaration of judicial
incompetence. It is true that in Branzburg and similar cases traditional
grounds for nonjusticiability are absent, 3 and indeed the question
involves traditional domains of judicial expertise: evidentiary privilege;
the powers of the grand jury; the rights of the criminally accused. Yet,
as noted above, it has been urged that these cases turn on questions of
empirical proof of deterrence of first amendment rights or, alterna-
tively, require the court to accept the premise that certain chilling
effects will result. Moreover, when the privilege is asserted in opposi-
tion to a criminal defendant's subpoena, the conflict between the first
and sixth amendments becomes an all but intractable dilemma. Per-
haps that is why the Branzburg Court concluded by reminding us that,
although the Court would not fashion a newsman's privilege from
constitutional cloth, Congress and state legislatures were free to enact
rules of privilege "and, equally important, to refashion those rules as
experience from time to time may dictate. '5 4
A legislative response to the journalist's privilege question resolves
complexities on several levels. A statutory, as opposed to a constitu-
tional, privilege is consistent with the concept that decisions regarding
the scope of such an evidentiary rule are more properly a question of
social policy than of fundamental principle.5 5 The principles are
50. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
51. See A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 183-98 (1962); Jaffe, Standing To Secure
Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1265, 1303 (1961).
52. A. Bickel, supra note 51, at 184. The "misgivings" alluded to in the text are included in
Professor Bickel's classic description of the political question: "[Tihe Court's sense of lack of
capacity, compounded in unequal parts of (a) the strangene;s of the issue and its intractability to
principled resolution; (b) the sheer momentousness of it, which tends to unbalance judicial
judgment; (c) the anxiety, not so much that the judicial judgment will be ignored, as that perhaps
it should but will not be; (d) finally ('in a mature democracy), the inner vulnerability, the
self-doubt of an institution which is electorally irresponsible and has no earth to draw strength
from." Id.
53. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
54. 408 U.S. at 706. The benefits of a legislative solution to the journalist's privilege question
have not been completely disregarded. For example, one recent commentator noted that the
question was one "particularly susceptible to legislative solution." Glekel, The 'Times' Free
Press-Fair Trial Case, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 7, 1978, at 2, col. 3.
55. This is supported by the history of the litigative campaign for a journalist's privilege. The
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already clear: the press shall be free; the defendant shall have compul-
sory process and due process. These principles do not change, but
surely the relationship between them is subject to fine tuning as our
society matures. As Justice White recognized in Branzburg, the practi-
cal effect of allocating this judgment to the legislatures is that altera-
tion and adjustment are more easily achieved. Constitutional pro-
nouncements from the Supreme Court, by contrast, are hardly the
media by which to prescribe experimental formulas for the laboratories
of the several states. The argument against etching privilege rules in
the constitutional tablet is especially potent when, as in the case of a
journalist's privilege, the issue is relatively new. Perhaps time will
uncover the impact of such rules in a way the empirical studies have
not.
56
The allocation of the privilege question to the legislative branch is
also a sensible use of factfinding resources. Given that advocates have
urged empirical studies of deterrence of first amendment rights as a
basis for a journalist's privilege, legislatures are better equipped than
are courts to respond to such data. Legislatures may commission
studies tailored to the contours of the perceived local problem and are
not confined to judicially noticing or receiving proof of previous
studies. The reliability of the data so adduced does not depend on the
fortuities of the resources, industry, or talent of the counsel before the
court. As Professor Davis has recently written:
Judges who decide policy questions and thereby make administrative law-whether
in interpreting constitutions, in interpreting statutes, or in developing common law-
necessarily need facts ....
The methods by which judges acquire the factual materials they need for developing
the administrative law they" create are largely unplanned and largely unsystematic.
Some records of cases contain rich collections of needed legislative facts; most do not.
Some judges are pleased to have elaborate Brandeis briefs, and other judges make
little use of extrarecord facts presented in briefs, even when they are well presented.5
7
To accept the premise that the journalist's privilege question re-
quires an accommodation of counterpoised constitutional interests and
to recognize that the various legislative departments have a significant
role to play in striking such a balance is not to say that the courts are
wholly ousted from their wonted role as arbiter of the meaning of the
Constitution. Even if courts decline to fashion an absolute constitu-
tional privilege out of the preexistent vacuum, surely the) will con-
attempt to gain a constitutional press privilege that met with failure in Bran:burg is said to have
been a reenactment of largely unsuccessful attempts to gain such a common law privilege in the
state courts in the 1950's and 1960's. Guest & Stanzler, supra note 23, at 20 & n 12
56. In both Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 706-08. and Zurcher v. Stanford Daily. 436 U.S 547, 566
(1978), Justice White dismissed claims of deterrence of first amendment rights as speculative and
noted that there will be time enough in the future to deal with specific instances of abuse
57. 1 K. Davis, supra note 31, § 2:15, at 125-26.
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tinue to be called upon to adjudicate the validity of the various shield
laws that have been, and will be, legislatively imposed. 58
The many extant state shield statutes5" defy reduction into a com-
posite shield law, and it is not the purpose here to propose a detailed
model. The broad outlines of a suitable shield law may, however, be
sketched out. The procedural component is often just as weighty as the
substantive content of the privilege provided. 60 Justice Frankfurter's
remark in quite another context may have application here as well:
"The history of liberty has largely been the history of observance of
procedural safeguards."' 61 In the present context, due process clearly
means the right of the reporter to be heard initially on his privilege
claim before producing any information called for by the subpoena.
For example, in a recent case, contested as vigorously in the press as it
was in the courtroom, the ultimate issue was not so much the substan-
tive content of a journalist's privilege but the right to argue such a
privilege to the court before complying with a subpoena issued at the
instance of the criminal defendant. 62 Similarly, the right to a hearing
even before issuance of the subpoena was urged by Professor Amster-
dam in 1973 hearings on a proposed, but never enacted, federal shield
law. 63
Thus, it is apparent that a statutory privilege should afford a
two-step procedure for adjudication of claims of privilege. First, the
journalist should have an opportunity to argue that, in the circum-
stances, any compelled disclosure of his sources or notes would violate
the first amendment, an argument left open by Branzburg but seem-
ingly limited to cases of bad faith or patent irrelevance of the de-
58. See, e.g., In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 598 (1978).
There, the Supreme Court of New Jersey refused to apply that state's shield law to the extent that
it would withhold from a criminal defendant compulsory process to obtain a newsman's notes
developed while researching stories that led to the indictment. For examples of state shield laws,
see Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2237 (Supp. 1978); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §§ 4320-4326 (1974);
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 767.5a (1968); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-21 to -2la (West 1978); Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 2739.04, .12 (Page 1954 & Supp. 1978).
59. "The term 'shield law' is commonly and widely applied to statutes granting newsmen and
other media representatives the privilege of declining to reveal confidential sources of informa-
tion." In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 269 n.2, 394 A.2d 333, 335 n.2, cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 598
(1978).
60. Senator Ervin suggests that a legislative resolution of the privilege problem may be
inferior to an ad hoc judicial resolution because the former is overly rigid. Ervin, supra note 5, at
267. This need not be so if the shield law provides a forum for speedy resolution of all first
amendment claims, without purporting to decide in the abstract "who wins" each case.
61. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 11943).
62. In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 598 (1978); see Lewis,
supra note 43.
63. Newsmen's Privilege: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 179-81 (1973).
[Vol. 4 7
1979] JOURNALIST'S PRIVILEGE
mand. 64 If such a threshold showing is not made, the second stage of
the proceeding should be in camera review of the contested material. 6
The standard of necessity to the defense or relevance to the issues in
the criminal case that must be shown before disclosure will be ordered
and the allocation of burden of proof as to this standard are precisely
the kind of judgments the legislature may implement to secure uni-
formity and a proper balance between competing interests. 66 Finally,
the panoply of remedies that may be granted should be enumerated.
The purpose of such an enumeration is not to curb judicial resource-
fulness but, on the contrary, to require the court to consider inter-
mediate solutions that fall between the extremes of full disclosure and
absolute privilege. 67
Would such a shield law pass constitutional muster? The flexibility
of the statute adumbrated above-emphasizing procedural safeguards
and general standards for disclosure without imposing fixed or absolute
substantive rules-makes a blanket judgment as to its validity impos-
sible and unnecessary, for it merely affords a forum for restriking the
constitutional balance according to the facts of each case, within
legislated guidelines. This partnership between the courts and legisla-
tures both raises and answers some interesting constitutional problems.
From the criminal defendant's point of view, the shield law di-
64. See 408 U.S. at 707; id. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring).
65. Recent decisions have invoked the in camera review process to resolve competing claims
of litigants to disclosure or protection of sensitive information. E.g., United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683 (1974); In re Halkin, No. 77-1313 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 19, 1979); Loral Corp. v, McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 558 F.2d 1130 (2d Cir. 1977). The difficulty of prosecuting certain defendants
who possess sensitive information has also, reportedly, led the present administration to consider
proposing legislation requiring in camera submission by the defendant of portions of his evidence
for pretrial judicial review. N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1979, at 1, col. 3.
66. Courts too have at times fashioned a relevancy test to limit journalists' materials subject
to disclosure, but they have differed on the applicable standard. See Guest & Stanzler, supra note
23, at 52 nn.165 & 166 (citing cases). For a recent compilation of shield laws containing specific
standards for disclosure, see Note, A Study in Governmental Separation of Powers: Judicial
Response to State Shield Laws, 66 Geo. L.J. 1273, 1289 n.103 (1978). The recent case State v.
Sandstrom, 224 Kan. 573, 581 P.2d 812 (1978), cert. denied, 99 S. CL 1265 (1979), summarizes
the case law in this fashion: "As a general rule, disclosure has been required only in those criminal
cases where it is shown the information in possession of the news reporter is material to prove an
element of the offense, to prove a defense asserted by the defendant, to reduce the classification or
gradation of the offense charged, or to mitigate or lessen the sentence imposed." Id. at 575, 581
P.2d at 815.
67. See Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, Nos. 78-6114, 78-6179, 78-3050 (2d Cir.
Mar. 19, 1979). There, the plaintiff alleged civil rights violations, including the use of confidential
informants, by various federal officers. The district court held the Attorney General in contempt
for refusing to obey a court order to disclose files including the informants' names. The Second
Circuit issued a writ of mandamus vacating the order of contempt, finding that in the
circumstances of this case the trial court, before resorting to compulsory disclosure, should have
considered issue-related remedies that would be less intrusive on the responsibilities of federal
officers.
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minishes his right to compulsory process under the sixth amendment.
Yet the possibility of such diminution does not require a conclusion
that the compulsory process clause is violated in every conceivable
circumstance by a shield law that withholds material from the defen-
dant. The scope of the clause is delineated in a line of recent cases
beginning with Washington v. Texas. 68 As one commentator has
concluded:
[T]he ... clause gives defendants definite but limited protection: it guarantees not that
the state will always succeed in producing witnesses for the defense, but that it will
make an appropriate effort to do so. The state has no duty to produce a witness who,
through no fault of its own, has become unavailable because of death, disappearance,
or illness. 6
9
Whether a potential witness' assertion of privilege is a form of "un-
availability" within this statement of the rule is a question currently
besetting and dividing the courts. 70 Unlike physical disappearance,
death, or the like, "unavailability" because of assertion of testimonial
privilege is in a way procured or made possible by the state, in
recognizing the privilege. But the shield law considered above is
decidedly remote from the state law struck down in Washington. That
statute barred testimony on behalf of, though not against, a criminal
defendant by a coparticipant in the charged crime. The disqualification
was one-sided, unreasonable, and arbitrary. One could hardly reach
the same conclusion about an enactment that established procedures
for compelling a journalist to yield only material that was necessary
and central to an accused's defense, in an effort to balance polar
constitutional commands. 7 1 In Washington, the statute prejudiced the
criminal defendant and favored the state as adversary in the criminal
process, whereas a state that granted a qualified journalist's privilege
would neutrally arbitrate the claims of opposed constituents both
deserving of protection-the press and the accused.
If a qualified shield law that gave the defendant access to material
vital to his case survives the sixth amendment, it nevertheless remains
exposed to continued first amendment challenge by the press. It is
submitted that the first amendment is not disserved by balancing its
68. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
69. Westen, supra note 30, at 595.
70. Id. at 626-27 nn.164 & 165 (citing cases).
71. Professor Westen, whose views on compulsory process are quoted at text accompanying
note 69 supra, leaves resolution of the viability of privilege rules under the sixth amendment for
another day, Westen, supra note 30, at 625-26, although in an earlier article he stated: "No
interest protected by a privilege is sufficiently important to outweigh the defendant's right to
establish his innocence through the presentation of clearly exculpatory evidence," Westen, The
Compulsory Process Clause, 73 Mich. L. Rev. 71, 161 (1974). Although this rule would
undermine an absolute press privilege, it would not invalidate one that limited forced disclosure
to "clearly exculpatory evidence" as determined in camera.
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demands against compelling countervailing interests of the individual
and society. If this is so, then a shield law that allows and requires
courts to determine the extent of disclosure, within legislated stan-
dards, on a case-by-case basis, and after full hearings that expose the
needs of all involved, should not be considered subversive of the first
amendment. Indeed, the reasonableness of such a legislative accom-
modation that suggests its viability under the compulsory process
clause similarly counsels a favorable result under first amendment
analysis.
The legal process concerns voiced earlier should support the con-
stitutionality of any shield law that does not go to the absolutist
extreme. When an elected branch of government offers its judgment on
the interface between two counterpoised tenets of the Bill of Rights,
the courts should heed. If legislatures are to act at all, the constitu-
tional language can do no more than set the outside limits, framing a
"window" of valid legislative alternatives. This is no different from our
jurisprudence in the establishment/freedom of religion area, where the
Supreme Court has long recognized that latitude must be afforded
between those polar commands if efforts to implement legislated policy
are to succeed.
7 2
One might consider an affirmative legislative role in determining the
meaning of a constitution to be a double-edged sword. Senator Ervin,
for example, reports the argument by some that rights granted only by
the legislature are as easily rescinded and thus less secure than
constitutional protection. 73 A recent writer voices the apprehension
that a shield law once enacted will be taken as the constitutional norm,
deterring the courts from venturing further in protecting the press. 74
These arguments fall wide of the mark. If we believe that the
meaning of the Constitution is shaped by the legislature in coordina-
tion with, and not wholly subservient to, the courts, then a legislative
enactment that defines the boundary of counterpoised rights neither
adds to nor dilutes either one7S5 it simply construes the Constitution,
72. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). In Everson, the Court said:
"New Jersey cannot consistently with the 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amend-
ment contribute tax-raised funds to the support of an institution which teaches the tenets and
faith of any church. On the other hand, other language of the amendment commands that New
Jersey cannot hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their own religion.. [Wle must be
careful, in protecting the citizens of New Jersey against state-established churches, to be sure that
we do not inadvertently prohibit New Jersey from extending its general state law benefits to all its
citizens without regard to their religious belief." Id. at 16.
73. Ervin, supra note 5, at 270-71.
74. Sack, The 'Times' Free Press-Fair Trial Case, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 7, 1978. at 2. cols- 4-5-
75. Cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966) (Congress may add to, but not
dilute, constitutional guarantees through legislation). See generally Monaghan, The Supreme
Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1975) (constitu-
tional adjudication by the Court is preeminent in area of "pure" constitutional law, but Congress
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as would any court. If it is true that a legislature could repeal a shield
law, this is only to say that it could decide to withhold a privilege that
the Constitution permitted but did not require. If it is true that a
legislative judgment could be taken as the constitutional norm, this is
only to say the courts could ratify and give proper deference to the
value choices implemented by a democratic organ of government.
CONCLUSION
Deciding "who decides" is often more important than the ultimate
judgment on the merits. In the case of constitutional construction, we
are accustomed to fighting the great battles in the courtroom, not on
the floors of Congress and the state legislatures. To date, however, the
campaign for judicial acknowledgment of a constitutional or
common law privilege of journalists to withhold confidential names
and data has not prospered. The reason is not antipathy of judges to
the press, but a resolve to submit the question in the first instance to
the democratic organs of national and state government. It would be
naive to say that the decisional process in those fora will be any easier
or speedier. It would be wrong to say that the judgments reached there
would be "better" than judicial ones on any absolute scale. By reposing
the question of a journalist's privilege primarily in the legislative
process, however, we will achieve the most orderly and mature
balance of the rights and interests of all concerned-including the
public.
may supersede the Court by legislating in area of "constitutional common law," such as
accommodation of conflicting rights or content of procedures required by due process).
